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Submilted by George Leitmann 
Conditions for the number of elements in habitual domains and for the activation 
propensity of each element in the habitual domains to become stabilized are 
described. The formation of stable states implies enduring personality and attitudes 
and conditioned or programmed behavior. Some important implications for 
decision analysis, high-stake decision problems, optimality, gaming and conflict 
resolution, and career management are also discussed. 0 1985 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
High-stake decision problems involving such things as the introduction 
of a new product into a competitive market, an important capital 
investment, corporate long-range strategy, or the resolution of a national 
or international crisis/conflict do not happen everyday. However, they are 
quite important and frequently occur in business and social organizations. 
Solving successfully the high-stake problem is vital for the survival of the 
organization. 
High-stake decision problems are, in general, characterized by a high 
level of uncertainty, great impact on future welfare, processing unfamiliar 
information, and rapid cognitive change before reaching the final solution. 
Usually the set of alternatives is not fixed. it is generated as needed. There 
are many conflicting criteria/attributes involved and their importance 
varies with time and situation variables. (See [9, lo] for further details.) 
Thus the setting of high-stake decision problems seems to be beyond the 
assumptions of traditional optimization theories (including mathematical 
programming, optimal control, game theory, and differential games) 
because optimization theories usually assume that the sets of alternatives 
and criteria are fixed, the perceived outcomes of decisions are clearly 
specified, and the preference for possible outcomes is known, simple, and 
unchanging. This observation implies that if one tries to understand and 
make good decisions in high-stake decision problems, a broader com- 
prehension of human psychology and behavior than pure mathematical 
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description and optimization is necessary. An attempt toward this end can 
be found in [2, 111 and citations therein. Another important question 
raised by the above observation is: Are traditional optimization theories 
applicable to high-stake decision problems? The results of this article can 
answer, at least partially, the above question affirmatively. Simply put, the 
results, using the concept of habitual domains [ 111 (to be briefly discussed 
at the end of this section), show that although decision elements (alter- 
natives, criteria. perception of decision outcomes, and preference) can vary 
markedly over time in high-stake decision problems, they eventually 
become stabilized and, therefore, can be analyzed by optimization theory. 
Although this stabilizing phenomenon has been observed empirically [2], 
it requires formal mathematical study and proof. 
The objective of this article is to demonstrate the existence of stable 
habitual domains. This will allow illustration of implications on optimality, 
high-stake decision problems, gaming and conflict dissolution, and career 
management. Specifically, Sections 2 and 3 are devoted to deriving two 
existence conditions for two kinds of stable habitual domains. Section 2 
utilizes convergence theory of sequences and Section 3 relies heavily on 
Grossberg’s theory [4]. Section 4 is devoted to a discussion of the 
implications of the existence theorems. Further topics of research are briefly 
suggested in Section 5. 
As a convenience to the reader we shall briefly sketch the concept of 
habitual domains in the remaining part of this section. Details of the con- 
cepts can be found in [ 111. 
The brain is the center of information processing for each human being. 
With an enormous number (estimated to be at least 15 billion) of neural 
cells, the brain processes the information by the sequence of pattern circuits 
of the excited cells. Similar to a computer, but far more sophisticated, the 
brain encodes, stores, and retrieves ideas, thoughts, and actions. In study- 
ing how a particular person (decision maker) makes his choice or decision, 
it is important to understand and to know what ideas and thoughts have 
been encoded and stored in his brain (or memory) and what ideas and 
thoughts can be activated by some particular events, stimuli, or by his own 
self-suggestion. The concept of habitual domain (HD) is thus introduced 
[ 111 as follows: 
By the habitual domain at time t, denoted by HD,, we mean the collec- 
tion of ideas and actions that can potentially be activated at time t. The 
actually activated set of ideas and actions is called actual domain, denoted 
by AD,. Similar to the relation between a sample space and a realized sam- 
ple value of a random variable, HD, indicates those that can possibly be 
activated, while AD, those that actually are. One can then assign a 
probability or confidence measure, denoted by P,, for AD, c HD, to 
occure. 
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Note that HD, and P, are dynamic over time and complicated, but they 
may be approximated. When HD, and P, reach a stable or steady state, 
one could expect habitual ways of thinking and behavior. Conditioned or 
programmed behavior, for instance, see [S], will then occur. 
In [11] the existence of stable HD, based on a set of hypotheses is 
described. Roughly, as each human being learns, his HD, grows with time, 
but at a decreasing rate because the probability for an arrival idea to be 
new with respect to HD, becomes smaller as HD, gets larger. Thus, unless 
unexpected extraordinary events arrive, HD, will reach its stable state. If 
extraordinary events do not arrive very often, habitual ways of thinking 
and action will prevail most of the time. This observation is the main 
motivation to use “habitual” as the adjective. As a complement to [Z, 111, 
this paper is devoted to describing rigorously the conditions under which 
HD, and P, can reach their stable states. 
2. STABILITY THEORIES ON THE NUMBER OF ELEMENTS 
IN HABITUAL DOMAINS 
Theoretically our mind is capable of almost unlimited expansion 
(imagine what can be done with a 15billion “bit” computer) [S], and with 
sufficient effort one could learn almost anything new over time. Although 
the amount of knowledge or ideas that exists in one’s mind may increase 
with time, the rate of increment tends to decrease as time goes by. As men- 
tioned before, this may be due to the fact that the probability of learning 
new ideas or actions becomes lower as the number of ideas or actions in 
the HD becomes larger. These observations enable us to show that the 
number of ideas in one’s HD, converges when suitable conditions are met. 
First let us introduce the following notations: 
(i) Let a, be the number of additional new ideas or concepts acquired 
during the period (t - 1, t]. Note that the time scale can be in seconds, 
minutes, hours, or days, etc. Assume that a, 3 0, and that once an idea is 
registered or learned, it will not be erased from memory, regardless of 
whether it can be retrieved easily or not. This assumption is consistent with 
the Law of Muss Action (for instance, see [8]), which states that once an 
idea is learned it will be registered, though scattered throughout the brain, 
and it is almost impossible to erase the idea completely. When a particular 
event is emphasized, a, designates the additional new ideas or concepts 
acquired during (t - 1, t] concerning that event. 
(ii) For convenience denote the sequence of a, throughout a period 
of time by {a,}. Note that due to the biophysical and environmental con- 
dition of the individual, (a,} is not necessarily monotonic. It can go up or 
down and is subject to certain fluctuation. For instance, people may 
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function better and more effectively in the morning than at night. Con- 
sequently, the a, in the morning will be higher than that at night. Also 
observe that (a,} may display a pattern of periodicity (day/night, for 
instance) which is unique for each individual. The periodicity can be a 
result of biophysical rhythms or rhythms of the environment. 
The following can be proved readily by applying the Ratio Test of Power 
series. 
THEOREM 2.1. Suppose there exists T such that whenever t > T, 
a, + ,/a, < r < 1. Then as t -+ CC, C ,“= 0 a, converges. 
Remark 2.1. Theorem 2.1 suggests that if the number of ideas or 
amount of learning in one’s HD is nondecreasing and the rate of increase is 
strictly decreasing with bounded ratio in time t > T, then as t gets larger 
the total number of ideas or amount of knowledge will approach a stable 
state. Note that a, + ,/a, 3 0 because each a, 2 0. 
The assumption of monotonicity of a, in Theorem 2.1 can be relaxed as 
follows: 
THEOREM 2.2. Assume that (i) there exists time index s, periodicity con- 
stant m > 0, and constants D and M, such that C,“=, a,+,, 6 D, where 
1s a subsequence of {a,} with periodicity m, and (ii) for any period 
~“et$ 
9 I- s+nm+ilma S+ nm < M. Then C,“=, a, converges. 
Proof: By the assumption (ii) we have 
,g, a,,,,,iGMm as+,,,,, (1) 
G 1 a,+Mma,+Mma,+,+ ... +Mma,+,,+ .‘. 
1=0 
< f a,+MmD<co as desired. 
f=O 
(Note that the inequalities come from (1) and assumption (i).) 
Note that for HD to converge, Theorem 2.2 does not require a, to be 
monotonically decreasing as required in Theorem 2.1. As long as there 
exists a convergent subsequence, and the sum of a, within a time period of 
length m is bounded, then a, can fluctuate up and down without affecting 
the convergence of HD,. Thus the assumptions in Theorem 2.2 are a step 
closer to reality than those in Theorem 2.1. 
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Remark 2.2. Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 imply that if the subsequence 
{a s+nm} is monotonically decreasing with a bounded ratio as n + cc, then 
CyEO a, converges. This idea is summarized as Corollary 2.1. 
COROLLARY 2.1. Suppose that the assumption (ii) of Theorem 2.2 holds 
and that 
a .T+flm la s+(n-l)mGY-= 1. 
Then C$, a, converges. 
Remark 2.3. The regular periodicity assumption in Theorem 2.2 can be 
removed and a more general assumption substituted resulting in the 
Imbedding Theory of Theorem 2.3. 
THEOREM 2.3. Assume that (i) there exists a subsequence 
{a, Ik = 1, L.} = (a,}, an d constants D and M, such that Ck ask + D and 
(ii) Ii= 1 Sk + 1 - Sk a Sk+r < Ma,,. Then C;“=O a, converges. 
Proof Note that 
F a,= 2 a,+s*~s’ a,,+i+s3fs2 as2+i+ ..’ 
t=O 1=0 i=l i= 1 
d 2 a, + M(a,, + as1 + *. .) 
t=0 
< $ a,+MD<co as desired. 
r=o 
Observe that Theorem 2.2 assumes a regular periodicity m in {a,}, which 
is replaced in Theorem 2.3 by a more general subsequence {a,,}, in which 
the length of periodicity sk - sk- 1 can be varied for different k’s. The HD, 
still converges as t + cc as long as the sum of subsequence ask converges 
and the total rate of increase between (sk- 1, sk] is bounded as required. ’ 
Remark 2.4. (i) By allowing sk - sk- 1 to vary for different k’s, we 
actually generalize the single periodicity to multiple periodicities. This 
generalization makes it possible to cover a variety of fluctuations of {a,}. 
(ii) From Theorems 2.1 and 2.3 we see that if the subsequence {a,} 
is strictly decreasing in ratio as k + co, then C;“=. a, converges. Precisely, 
we have Corollary 2.2. 
COROLLARY 2.2. Suppose that the assumption (ii) in Theorem 2.3 holds 
and askiask ~, < y -=c 1. Then x,“=. a, converges. 
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3. THE STABILITY OF HABITUAL DOMAINS IN 
TERMS OF ACTIVATION PROPENSITY 
In this section the stability of the “strength” of the elements in HD, to be 
activated, called activation propensity: is studied. Note that the activation 
propensity, like probability mass, is a measurement for P, (discussed in 
Section 1). Define x,(t), in HD,, to be the actiuution propensity of element i 
at time t. For simplicity let HD, = { 1, 2 . . . . . n} and x = (x ,,..., x,,). Note that 
n, the number of elements in HD,, can be very large. As x,(t) is a 
measurement of the force for idea i to be activated, we can assume that 
x,(t) 3 0. Note that xi(t) = 0 means that idea i cannot be activated at time t. 
By assigning x;(t) = 0 if necessary, we may assume that HD, contains all 
possible ideas that may be acquired now and in the relevant future. 
Similar to charge structures of Yu [ 111, xi(r) may be a measurement of 
charge or force for idea i to occupy the “attention” at time t. Note that 
xi(t)/C, xi(t) can be a measurement of the relative strength of idea i to be 
activated. If all x,(t) become stable after some time, the relative strength of 
each i to be activated will also be stable. In this case one may think that 
idea i can be activated with probability xj(r)E, x,(t). We shall explore 
under what condition all x,(t) can become stable. In Section 3.1 we shall 
first formulate the dynamic change of x(t) in terms of a system of differen- 
tial equations by utilizing the results discovered in neuropsychology and 
mathematical psychology (see [335]). In Section 3.2 we shall prove a 
theorem of stability of x(t). Our work has been motivated by Grossberg’s 
works [3, 41. 
3.1. Formulation of the Dynamics of Activation Propensity 
It is known that some kind of “structural” or “chemical” change must 
take place in the brain when new information is acquired and stored per- 
manently [S]. When external stimuli are presented and attended to or 
when one is actively engaged in the thinking process, a sequence of circuit 
patterns of activated neural cells will appear in the brain. This sequence is 
regarded as the interpreting and thinking process provoked by the stimuli 
or self-suggested thinking process [S, 111. 
This observation and other empirical studies lead to the formation of the 
hypothesis concerning the neural representation of the elements in the HD, 
called the Circuit Pattern Hypothesis. The hypothesis is summarized as 
follows (for a detailed discussion, see [3, 8, 111). 
(i) Each element or idea in the HD is represented by a unique circuit 
pattern of the excited neural cells. The pattern can be imprinted in a num- 
ber of sections of the brain. When the circuit pattern is activated by an 
appropriate stimulus, the corresponding idea will emerge. 
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(ii) The strength or the activation propensity xi(t) can be enhanced 
through its repeated activations. The stronger the circuit pattern and the 
more sections of the brain in which the circuit pattern is imprinted, the 
easier the corresponding idea or element can be retrieved or activated. 
Thus, x,(t) is an increasing function of the strength of the pattern and the 
number of sections of the brain in which circuit pattern i corresponding to 
idea i is imprinted. 
Since idea i is represented by an activated circuit pattern of neural cells, 
the factors which influence the activation of the neural cells will also 
influence the activation propensity x(t). According to the finding of neural 
psychology (see [3, 81, for instance), there are at least three factors which 
may influence the neural circuit pattern and xi(t): 
(i) Spontaneous decay: When an idea or concept is not rehearsed, its 
propensity to activate tends to degenerate with time because (1) the 
relative strength of the circuit pattern against others may be reduced, and 
(2) according to the most efficient restructuring of memory (for instance, 
[S, 1 1 ] ), the idea, if not activated, may be stored, perhaps gradually, in a 
relatively remote area and is relatively more difficult to be retrieved or 
activated. 
(ii) Internal excitation and inhibition effects: When a circuit pattern i 
corresponding to element iE HD, is activated, the circuit pattern can send 
out both excitation and inhibition signals. The excitation signal activates 
the circuit pattern i imprinted in other sections of the brain, and at the 
same time imprints the circuit pattern i in new sections of the brain. While 
the activated circuit pattern i sends out excitation signal, it also sends out 
inhibition signal which inhibits or suppresses the excitation of the other cir- 
cuit patterns. 
(iii) External influence: External stimuli or information inputs acting 
as stimuli to the memory can affect various circuit patterns to be imprinted 
and stored in the brain. They have an impact on excitation or inhibition of 
various circuit patterns. 
With the above observation and the work of neural cognition (for 
instance, see [3-5, S]), we are ready to describe relevant assumptions and 
construct the dynamic evolution of x(t) as follows. Refer to Fig. 1 for the 
interaction among ideas i, j, and k. 
Assumption 3.1. Given x(t) and sufficiently small time interval At, 
x(t+At)-x(t) is given by 
xj(t + At) - x,(t) = +,x,(t) At + (qi- x,(t)) [hi(xi(t)) + Zj] At 
1 gdxdf)) +J, At 1 k#l (2) 
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FIGURE 1 
where 
(i) cl; > 0 is the instantaneous decaying factor for x,(t); thus 
- cr,x,(t) At is the reduction of the propensity due to natural spontaneous 
decay. 
(ii) qi> 0 is a maximum potential propensity value for idea i; thus 
qi - x,(t) is a measurement of “under potential,” which gives the magnitude 
to which xi(t) can further be increased. 
(iii) hi(xi(t)) is the self-excitation function for idea i so that during 
the time interval (t, t + At], the propensity of idea i is increased by 
(qi-x,(t)) h(xi(t)) At due to the impact of xi(t). 
(iv) Ii 2 0 is the external rate of excitation by environment on idea i 
so that the propensity of idea i is increased by (q, - xi(l)) I,At during the 
time interval (t, t + At]. 
(v) g,(x,) is the inhibition function of idea k so that the propensity 
reduction of idea i by xk(t) during (t, t + At] is given by gk(xk(t)) x,(t) At. 
(vi) Ji 2 0 is the rate of inhibition of the external environment acting 
on idea i. Thus idea i’s propensity is reduced by x,(t)J, At during the time 
interval (t, t + At]. 
Remark 3.1. Assumption 3.1 is an additive model which is similar to 
well-known on-center off-surround models for cognition patterns. Roughly 
speaking, when a cognition pattern is activated, it, on one hand, tends to 
enhance its strength for further activation and, on the other hand, tends to 
reduce the strength for activation of other cognitive patterns. For a more 
detailed discussion see [3-5, 81. Note that the model proposed here is 
slightly different from that proposed in [3-51 in which it is assumed that 
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the effective rates of excitation signals and inhibition signals are the same 
(i.e., hi(xi)=gi(xi), for each i= I,..., n). We do not make such an 
assumption here. 
Now, by taking 
lim Xj(t+dt)-Xi(t) 
df+o Ar ’ 
from (2), one obtains 
ii(t) = -IxjXi(t) + (4i-Xi(t)) Chi(Xi(f)) + Ii] 
C gk(Xk(tl) +Ji 1 k#i (3) 
which can be written as 
-ti( t)= Xi(t) { - (xl - Ji + gi(Xi( 2))4 giry [h,(x,(r) + ZJ I 
-c sk(Jkw) k 
=ai(x(f)l Cbi(xi(t))-c(x(t))l (4) 
with 
ai(x(t))=xi(t) (5) 
bi(xi( t)) = -Qi - Ji t gi(Xi( t)) + “ii,Gfr’ [hi(Xi(t)) t Ii] (6) 
I 
(7) 
Note that bi(xi(t)) depends on xi only, while c(x) depends on all xi, 
i = l,..., n. Equation (4) has been extensively studied by Grossberg [4] for 
its stability. 
We summarize the above discussion into: 
THEOREM 3.1. If Assumption 3.1 is satisfied, then the time derivative of 
x(t) at time t satisfies Eqs. (4)-(7). 
3.2. Stability of Activation Propensity x(t) 
In this subsection, conditions that guarantee that lim,, m x(t) exists wilt 
be derived. Note that when the limit exists, activation propensity x(t) will 
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reach its steady state. Toward this end, we shall first quote a known result 
of Grossberg [4] concerning the stability of the solution to Eq. (4). 
THEOREM 3.2. With respect ro Eq. (4), .t = u,(x) [b,(.x,) - c(.u)]. assume 
that the following conditions hold: 
(I) Smoothness: 
a.(x) is continuous ,jor x 3 0; 
i:; b.;. ) ‘th , Y, ts er er continuous with piecewise derivatives for xi 2 0, 
or is continuous with piecewise derivatives for xi > 0 and b,(O) = mo; 
(cl c(x) is continuous with piecewise derivatives for x > 0. 
(II) Nonnegativity: 
a,(x) > 0 lyX( > 0 and x, 3 0, j # i 
a,(x)=0 ifx,=O and x, 3 0, j # i. 
Moreover, there exists a function a;( x,) such that, ,for sujficiently small 3. > 0, 
a,(x,)~a,(x) ifxe [0, i]” and ji(dw/a,(w))= W. 
(III) Boundedness: 
lim SUP,,, _ % hi(w) < c(0 ,..., 0, a, 0 . . . . . 0) 
where “co” occurs in the ith entry, i= 1, 2 ,,.., n. 
(IV) Competition: 
&l>o 
ax,’ ’ k = 1, 2,. .., n. 
Then, given any initial point x(O) 3 0, all the limits bj(xi( cc)) = c(x( co)) 
exist (called “weak global stability”). Furthermore, if all b,(x,) possess 
jmitely many local maxima within the range of xi, then given any x(0) > 0, 
all limits xi( co ) = lim ( t ;c, xi(t) exist, i = l,..., n. (This is called “strong global 
stability.“) 
THEOREM 3.3. Assume that (i) Assumption 3.1 is satisfied so that the 
evolution of x(t) is described by Eqs. (4)-(7) and that for each i= l,..., n the 
inhibition function g,(w) and the self-activation function hi(w), i = l,..., n, are 
bounded, nondecreasing, and continuous with piecewise derivative for w  > 0 
and (ii) g,(O) =O, hi(O) =O. Then given any initial point x(0)20, all the 
limits bi(xi( co)) = lim, _ m bi(xi(t)) exist and b,(x,(co)) = c(x(a)) (i.e., weak 
global stability is achieved). Furthermore, if all bi(xi) defined in Eq. (6) 
possess finitely many local maxima within the range of x,, then given any 
x(0) 2 0, all limits xi(~) = lim,, c1, x,(t) exist, i= l,..., n (i.e., strong global 
stability is achieved). 
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Proof. In view of Theorem 3.2, it suffices to verify that conditions 
(I)-(IV) are satisfied. That the (I) smoothness condition is satisfied is clear 
from Eqs. (5t(7) and the assumption that each gi and hi is continuous 
with piecewise derivatives. That the (II) nonnegativity condition is satisfied 
is also clear by Eq. (5) and by selecting d,(x,) = xi = a,(x). To verify that the 
(III) boundedness condition is satisfied, note that by Eqs. (6) and (7) 
limsuph,(w)= -cc,-Ji+g,(cc)--h,(a)-Ij<c(O ,..., 0, cc,0 ,.., O)=gi(oo). 
Note that since each gi(w) and hj( w) is nondecreasing and bounded, gi( co) 
and hi( cc) do exist. The strict inequality holds because ai > 0. Finally, for 
(IV), by Eq. (7), &/ax, = dgk(.xk)/dxk > 0, whenever the derivative exists 
because each g, is nondecreasing. 
Remark 3.2. In the weak global stability, because bi(xi(~)) = c(x( cc)), 
oscillations of xi(t), i = l,..., a, that might occur become arbitrarily slow as 
t + co. To ensure the strong global stability, we need that b,(x,) possess 
finitely many local maxima within the range of xi. This condition is usually 
satisfied in most applied problems. When all g,(x,) and h,(x,) are analytic 
functions, the condition will be satisfied. 
Remark 3.3. The ideas of HD, discussed in Theorem 3.3 may be regar- 
ded as “elementary” ideas (like “elementary event” in sampling space in 
statistics). An idea can be regarded as a collection of these elementary 
ideas. The similarity of two ideas may be represented by the intersection of 
the elementary ideas contained in the two ideas (or common elementary 
ideas). This definition may be used to study the concept that one idea may 
activate other ideas or association hypothesis [ll]. The problem is very 
complex and beyond the scope of this paper. 
4. IMPLICATIONS 
In Sections 2 and 3 we have shown that under suitable conditions the 
number of elements in HD, and the activation propensity of each element 
in HD, will reach their stable or steady states. Under stable states we can 
expect habitual ways of thinking, response, and reaction to stimuli and 
events to occur. Thus, personality, attitude, and conditioned or program- 
med behavior will be formed for each individual. Such formation has great 
impact on decision making styles and optimization theories. We can sketch 
briefly some of the important implications of the existence of stable 
habitual domains as follows: 
(i) On high-stake decision problems. Although the four decision elements, 
alternatives, criteria, perceived outcomes of decisions, and preference, can 
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vary with time, information inputs, and psychological states of the decision 
maker, they can become stabilized (see [2] for an empirical study) and 
application of optimization theories to high-stake decision problems can 
become feasible. Before the stabilization, a formal analysis using 
optimization theory is not fruitful, During the transition period we might 
be better off to let our HD, open and expand, allowing vigilant search for 
all relevant information on the four decision elements, making sure a 
“good” alternative is not overlooked. 
(ii) On optimal solutions. As decision process depends on HD, so does 
the resulting optimal solutions. Since HD, can vary over time (even though 
it can reach its stable states most of the time), optimal solutions will 
change with time. This occurs when the set of alternatives, the set of 
criteria, dimension of alternatives, perception of outcomes, and preference 
change. This suggests that in dynamic settings “time-optimality” is impor- 
tant and that an alternative being perceived as optimal is valid only over a 
time horizon. See Yu [9, 101 for further details. Today’s optimal solution 
does not imply that it will be optimal forever. As HD, changes, it may 
become an inferior solution. Being aware of this fact we can prevent sur- 
prise over other people’s (decision makers’) “irrational” decisions. After all 
a decision is rational if it is consistent with the decision maker’s HD,. 
Everyone’s HD, is unique. What we perceive as irrational may be very 
rational from other people’s point of view (HD,). 
(iii) On gaming and conflict dissolution. Each player has a unique HD,. 
Understanding our own HD, and the opponents’ HD, is essential to winn- 
ing competitive games or resolving conflicts. If we know our own HD, but 
do not know the opponents’ HD,, we cannot confidently construct winning 
strategy. Indeed we could lose the game entirely, like the Pearl Harbor dis- 
aster (see [7] for a detailed discussion of the mistake). If we do not know 
our own and the opponents’ HD,, very likely we would lose most games. 
In partial cooperative and partial competitive games, like international 
trade or companies competing for market share and market volume with 
the same kinds of products, it might be desirable for the players to settle in 
peace and ensure that each one is benefited. To maintain some stability the 
settlement must allow each player to declare a victory, or the terms of 
agreement must be a time-optimal solution from the point of view of each 
player’s HD,. Certainly this is not an easy task. Proposing new alter- 
natives, creating new conceptions of the criteria, and suggesting outcomes 
for the players to change their corresponding HD, will become vital. 
Without a new set of compatible HD,‘s, agreement can hardly be reached. 
Certainly, to successfully restructure HD, we must first be aware of the 
existing HD, of each player. 
(iv) On career management. In a broader sense, each social organization 
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(family, company, school, society, nation, etc.) can be regarded as a living 
entity and can have a habitual domain, HD,. The habitual domain can 
also be stabilized. The persons within the organization performing a variety 
of functions also have their own HD,. The match of these habitual 
domains is important for considering career success and happiness. If the 
HD’s are compatible and if they enhance each other, we may expect a fairly 
happy individual in the organization; otherwise, conflict and frustration 
can occur and adjustment must be made in order to keep the individual 
with the organization. 
If we regard human beings as adapting entities to their environments, 
then choosing an organization for association becomes an optimal match 
problem between his HD, and the organization’s HD,. Are there ideal 
organization HD,‘s to which an individual can adapt? Can he change the 
organization HD, or is it easier to change his? Should he leave an 
organization for a new one which reveals a more compatible HD,? These 
are some important questions that each individual must address for career 
success and so deserve a careful exploration. Some related literature can be 
found in Holland [6] and citations therein. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that under suitable conditions the number of elements in 
HD and the activation propensity of each element can reach its stable 
states. When the stable states are reached, one can expect habitual ways of 
thinking process and decision making. The implications are many as dis- 
cussed in Section 4. We are especially excited about the implications on 
high-stake decision problems, gaming and conflict dissolution, and career 
management. All these problems are seldom addressed in optimization 
theories. The concept of HD, can play an important role in their analysis. 
These certainly are important areas for further research and exploration. In 
[ 11, Chan has applied the concept to conflict resolution and has suggested 
some methods to identify HD,, but more needs to be done. From a 
theoretical point of view, how to relax the conditions relative to the 
existence of stable HD is worthy of exploration. 
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